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The You Turn 
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This introductory paper sets out a framework for approaching some of the claims about 
the second person made by the papers collected in the special edition of Philosophical 
Explorations on The Second Person (2014, 17:3). It does so by putting centre stage the 
notion of a ‘bipolar second person relation’, and examining ways of giving it substance 
suggested by the authors of these papers. In particular, it focuses on claims made (and 
denied) in these papers (a) about the existence and/or nature of second person thought, 
second person reasons for action and second person reasons for belief and (b) about 
possible connections among thought-theoretical, ethical and epistemological issues 
and debates in this area. 
Keywords: second person; second person thought; second person reasons; bipolarity; 
second person relations 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The past few years have witnessed an exponentially growing body of work conducted 
under the ‘second person’ heading, in various areas of philosophy (philosophy of mind, 
philosophy of language, ethics and epistemology), in developmental psychology, in psy- 
chiatry and even in neuroscience.
1 
To put it at its most general, and ambitious, the idea 
driving much of this work is this. Proper attention to the ways we relate to each other 
when we are in position to refer to each other using the second person pronoun, can 
deliver something like a paradigm shift in the way we address questions about a range    
of fundamental issues in these ﬁelds. In particular, appeal to second person relations is 
said to show how, contrary to centuries of theorizing in philosophy, we in fact bridge  
what is often supposed to be an unbridgeable gap between our ﬁrst person awareness of 
ourselves and our third person awareness of others, where this in turn is supposed to   
have deep implications for our understanding of morality, knowledge transmission and 
more. 
‘Like Martin Buber, who likens Feuerbach’s laying hold of Thou to a Copernican revo- 
lution in human self-understanding, I can get carried away by such talk. But what does it 
mean?’ asks Douglas Lavin in ‘Other Wills’, this issue. And, one might add, what  
exactly does ‘it’ refer to? For there are many such talks, across many domains, and a    
rich variety of accounts of why and to what taking the second person seriously makes a 
difference. Confronted with this abundance, a natural reaction is to steer clear of attempting 
to relate debates under the ‘second person’ heading in one ﬁeld to those in another, and 
focus, instead, as is already the practice, on trying to get clearer on issues in one particular 
area. 
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Fruitful as this kind of approach has been, though, such internal debates often seem to 
ﬂounder on two related questions. The ﬁrst is the question of what makes something a 
second person this or that – how do we distinguish between stipulation and substance? 
Call this the ‘existential question’. The second is the question of why it matters whether 
there are such things, what kind of difference does one answer or another to the existential 
question make? Call this the ‘signiﬁcance question’. Of course, how one answers the latter 
depends, in part, on answers to the existential question, which in turn can, and arguably 
should, be inﬂuenced by the signiﬁcance question, and there is danger of reaching a    
point where wheels begin to spin in a  vacuum. 
Such problems are, of course, not unique to the second person. In this respect, though, 
second person issues are arguably at an advantage precisely because the ‘second person’ 
heading is used in several areas of research. For what this provides, for each debate, is 
scope for widening the circle of considerations relevant to formulating and addressing 
both the existential and the signiﬁcance questions. That, at any rate, is the thinking  
behind this issue. In the next section, I say something about the areas  of  research 
touched on, and sketch a framework for comparing existence and signiﬁcance claims 
made (and denied) by the papers in this issue. Before that, a brief word about my  title. 
If we take ‘you turn’ to refer to a doctrine or set of worked out new answers to age-old 
problems, the negative point to emerge from widening the debate is that we do not yet 
command a clear enough view of the shape of the terrain to formulate, let alone assess, any- 
thing that might count as a ‘second person theory’ of anything (for an eloquent expression 
of doubt on this score, see Lavin). On a less dramatic understanding of ‘you turn’, though, 
to take the turn is to think that raising questions under the ‘second person’ heading intro- 
duces fascinating new ways of connecting problems in areas of research that tend to be 
sealed off from each other. That is the intended reading of the title, and the sense in  
which I think it is right to say that all the contributions to this issue are engaged in the 
turn. Here, we focus exclusively on a small number of philosophical issues raised by the 
‘you turn’, thus understood, in ethics, epistemology, theory of thought and philosophy of 
mind, with the hope that doing so will also provide the beginning of a framework for 
approaching other closely related philosophical problems and interdisciplinary questions 
raised by psychologists working under the ‘second person’ label. 
 
2. Second person relations 
To get going, it will help to have before us the following stipulative, minimal and topic- 
neutral deﬁnition of the notion of a ‘second person  relation’.  Suppose you and I are  
having a conversation, about anything – a book, a philosophical problem, the state of the 
world, someone we are both looking at. In virtue of having such a conversation we are 
each in position to use the second person pronoun to address each other. Conversations are 
not the only kind of exchange that makes use of the second person pronoun possible and 
appropriate simply in virtue of engaging in the exchange. Any form of verbal communication 
does this, but so too do jointly attending to an object, sharing a smile, exchanging gifts and so 
forth. I will call instances of the relation in which two people stand to each other, in virtue of 
which use of the second person is possible and appropriate, ‘second person relations’. 
To take us one step further in characterizing this relation, thickening it, so to speak, but 
in a topic-neutral way, I will avail myself of the metaphor of ‘bipolarity’, coined by Michael 
Thompson in his ‘What is it to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle about Justice’. In that paper, 
Thompson argues that there are propositions such as: ‘X wronged Y by doing A’;  ‘X has   
a duty to Y to do A’  and many others, which are such that in judging them to be   true, 
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I may be said to view a pair of distinct agents as joined and opposed in a formally distinctive 
type of practical nexus. They are for me like the opposing poles of an electrical apparatus: in 
ﬁlling one of these forms with concrete content, I represent an arc of normative current as 
passing between the agent-poles, and as taking a certain path’. (2004,  335) 
 
Such judgements, in Thompson’s terms, exhibit an essential ‘bipolarity’, and 
 
this special posture of the mind in coupling certain representations of agents marks the resulting 
judgements as belonging to the element of justice’ . . .  The mark of this special virtue of human 
agents, as Aristotle says, is that it is ‘toward another’, pros heteron or pros allon . . .  It is charac- 
teristic of the individual bearer of justice, in this traditional sense, to apprehend this order of 
thought and to deliberate with ﬁrst-person judgements of the bipolar type . . .  —and thus to 
view herself as related to others, and as other to others, in this peculiar way. (2004,  336) 
 
Appealing to a relation in which I stand to you to explain moral duties I have with respect to 
you is contrasted by Thompson with appealing to monadic, that is, non-relational norms, 
moral laws and the like. Later, I return to the role that appeals to bipolarity might play in 
discussions of the role of the second person in ethics. Here, I want to strip the metaphor 
of its speciﬁcally ethical point, and use it to give a topic-neutral thickening to the notion 
of a ‘second person relation’. 
To this end, consider the following judgements (a) ‘Jack saw Jill’; (b) ‘Jack and Jill 
watched a ﬁlm together’; (c) ‘Jack promised Jill that p ’ or ‘Jack told Jill that p’. In the 
ﬁrst, although two people are referred to, the predicate ‘seeing’ applies to one of them 
only, Jack (singular predication). In the second, two subjects are referred to and the predi- 
cate ‘watched a ﬁlm’ applies to both (plural predication). When we turn to the third group, it 
may seem to have the surface form of singular predication, it is Jack who is promising or 
telling, but when we look at the truth conditions for such judgements, this turns out to be 
misleading. Or so the bipolarity intuition suggests. There are various ways of putting this 
intuition. Minimally, in contrast to the ﬁrst group, we might say that although the form    
is superﬁcially that of singular predication, some kind of response or ‘uptake’ from the 
second subject is required. More substantively, and this is where the contrast with simple 
plural predication steps in, what is required from the second subject is both distinct    
from, and interdependent with, what is required from the ﬁrst. This is, very minimally, 
some of what the idea of two ‘opposing poles’ is meant to capture, which Thompson 
himself also signiﬁes by appeal to the idea of one subject being ‘opposite’ or ‘as against’ 
the other. (For an extended, far less crude account of related distinctions, on which I have 
drawn, see Sebastian Ro¨ dl’s ‘Intentional Transaction’, this  issue.) 
Given a few such contrasting threesomes of judgements, it is plausible to claim that 
people would generally agree with each other about how to categorize them (where this 
allows for occasional divergence and hesitation over particular cases). Suppose we think 
such agreement serves to ‘save the phenomenon’, so to speak. As always, the interesting 
question is whether it has an explanation, and if so, what it is. One way of putting the ques- 
tion all the papers here have a bearing on is this. If there are interesting explanations of it, do 
they introduce substantive second person existential and signiﬁcance claims? 
In fact, much of the current literature tends to divide into two independent ways of 
giving substance to the bipolarity metaphor. One appeals to particular kinds of thinking 
involved in, or on some accounts constitutive of, second person bipolar relations. We  
ﬁnd this in discussions of whether there is such a thing as ‘you-thinking’ or second  
person understanding of others. The second attempts to give bipolarity normative substance 
by appealing to relations of accountability and authority that are said to be presupposed in 
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speech acts such as telling or commanding or demanding, where the idea is that participat- 
ing in these provides subjects with something properly labelled ‘second person reasons’, 
moral and epistemological. 
Each of these ways of developing the bipolarity metaphor has generated a large, some- 
what technical, self-contained literature, the point of which can be lost when our interest is 
in why the second person has seemed to many to be so important. It is the burden of Lavin’s 
paper that progress with what I called ‘existence’ and ‘signiﬁcance’ questions in these dis- 
tinct areas rests on recognizing their interdependence, and several of the papers here point to 
ways of doing so. This is also the rationale for this issue. For the purposes of introduction, 
though, I will initially adhere to the division. In Section 3, I introduce papers concerned 
with the problem of second person thought; in Section 4, I introduce issues raised by the 
claim that testimony and morality are grounded in speech acts that provide for second 
person reasons for action and belief. Finally, in Section 5, I return to questions raised by 
several papers of possible connections among these different ways of explicitly or implicitly 
using the metaphor of bipolarity to give the second person relation substantive  import. 
 
 
3. Second person thought 
3.1. The you-indexicality claim 
One version of the thought-theoretical problem can be introduced by considering a variation 
on an example of John Perry’s in ‘The Essential Indexical’ (1979). Suppose you see 
someone in the mirror and on that basis judge: ‘that person is dispersing sugar on the super- 
market ﬂoor’. At some point you may realize: ‘I am that person’. Perry’s idea is that ‘I’- 
thinking is essentially indexical in the sense that its expression cannot be replaced by   
any term other than the ﬁrst person, and the aim of his paper is to give a substantive charac- 
terization of what this way of thinking is. 
Our question can, by analogy, be introduced as follows. Suppose you see someone else, 
Sally, trailing sugar and think to yourself ‘That person is trailing sugar’. You then decide to 
inform Sally of this, and say to her: ‘You are trailing sugar’. Our question is: are you, in 
addressing Sally, expressing a new way of thinking of Sally, one which, by analogy with 
the indexicality claim made about ‘I’-thinking, can only be expressed in this way? Call a 
positive answer to this question the ‘you-indexicality claim’. 
A much-cited negative answer to this question is to be found in the following passage 
by Richard Heck. 
 
Consider the indexical ‘you’. As a matter of its standing meaning, an utterance of ‘you’ refers 
to the person addressed in that utterance. But in the sense that there is such a thing as a self- 
conscious, ﬁrst person belief, there is no such thing as a second-person belief, or so it seems 
to me . . .  I mean to deny that there is any such thing as an essentially indexical second- 
person belief. The phenomenon of the second person is a linguistic one, bound up with the 
fact that utterances, as we make them, are typically directed to people, not just made to the 
cosmos. (If there were speakers of a language who never directed their utterances to their 
fellows, they would have no use for the second person.) The word ‘you’ has no correlate at 
the level of thought: if not, then the contents of the beliefs we express using the word ‘you’ 
have very little to do with its standing meaning. (2002,  12) 
 
What exactly does Heck mean when he denies that there is an essentially indexical second 
person belief? Longworth’s suggestion in ‘You and Me’, which I adopt, is that the most 
plausible reading of his claim emerges when we take on board the sense in which Heck 
thinks there are ﬁrst person indexical beliefs. According to Heck, there is a kind of 
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thought about oneself one can think only if one is the person thought about; and this pre- 
cisely mirrors the conditions for the correct us of ‘I’ to refer to a person – one can only use it 
if one is that person. That is the sense in which such thoughts are essentially indexical. 
Heck’s claim about the second person is that, in contrast,  there is no way of thinking   
that can only be employed when conditions for the use of the second person pronoun are 
met. I will label this the ‘non-indexicality claim’. 
The intuition underpinning the non-indexicality claim can be brought out by returning 
to our example. As I presented it, you are thinking demonstratively about Sally and then 
decide to address her. The simple intuition is that as far as thought about Sally is concerned 
you already have everything needed, and this is true of every occasion in which you are in a 
position to use ‘you’ – you have the other in mind in virtue of perceiving her or represent- 
ing in her in some other way. Of course, this on its own does not rule out the claim that you 
are now, in using ‘you’, also thinking of her in a new, you-indexical way, but, at the very 
least, it does seem to make any such new thinking redundant. What role could it have, given 
that you already have Sally in mind? 
One immediate response to this question can help reﬁne Heck’s challenge. The response 
says that when I address Sally, I do not think of her merely as ‘that (perceived) object’. I think 
of her as a subject, a thinker of ‘I’ thoughts who is aware of my own ‘I’ thoughts and of my 
awareness of her as a subject. Suppose, following Christopher Peacocke, we call this kind of 
awareness ‘interpersonal self-consciousness’ (Peacocke 2014).2 On Peacocke’s own account, 
this requires three levels of embedding in the contents of each subject’s self-conscious 
thought. But, crucially, on his account, properly explaining interpersonal self-consciousness 
does not affect the Heck claim, which he endorses. For none of these iterated levels of self- 
consciousness require, on his account, that the other person one is thinking of be represented 
in a way that requires that the conditions for the use of ‘you’ be met. That is, on such an 
account, doing justice to interpersonal self-consciousness only requires invoking ways of 
thinking about another person that are available to be engaged in independently of the occur- 
rence of the kind of social interaction that warrants the use of ‘you’. 
This is a rough formulation of the kind of claim the you-indexicality claim should be seen 
as pitted against. What the you-indexicality claims says, in response, is that the kind of self- 
consciousness we ﬁnd in instances where the second person relation, as so far stipulatively 
deﬁned, holds, essentially involves a way of thinking of another, which I label ‘you-thinking’, 
that can only be expressed by ‘you’ – a way of thinking of another that requires that one meet 
conditions that exactly mirror the conditions for the use of ‘you’. 
That is the claim. Versions of it, though sometimes differently expressed, are argued for 
and defended by four of the papers collected here, those by Ro¨ dl, Longworth, Heal and 
Haase. They do so in distinct ways, in some cases from very different thought-theoretical 
and even metaphysical perspectives. Each of these papers is rich in claims and ideas I 
cannot hope to touch on here. I make do with a telegraphic summary of claims  they  
make that are relevant to articulating, developing and arguing for the you-indexicality 
claim, and then return to a discussion of key points they have in  common. 
In his contribution to this issue, Ro¨dl puts centre-stage something he calls ‘intentional 
transactions’ such as giving someone an apple. The distinctive mark of such transactions, 
according to Ro¨ dl, is they cannot be analysed into a combination of two acts – they are 
essentially acts for two. This, in turn, is to be explained, he argues, by treating such trans- 
actions as constituted by a kind of thinking he labels ‘dyadic self predication’, which is an 
essentially relational kind of self-consciousness, a thinking of oneself as ‘opposite’ or 
‘towards’ the other, in which each subject employs something he calls an ‘I-you’  
concept. A key claim he argues for, as far as the you-indexicality claim is concerned, is 
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that we cannot explain the kind of self-consciousness involved in such transactions by 
equipping each subject with a kind of interpersonal self-consciousness that has the  
content it has independently of the transaction. 
For Longworth, the intuitive datum we prima facie fail to account for if we reject you- 
indexicality is something he calls the ‘coordination claim’. One part of it says that it is a 
requirement on A’s understanding B telling her, for example: ‘You are about to miss your 
train’ that B must think ‘I am about to miss my train’. He suggests that the best explanation 
of what is involved in such interpersonal coordination will appeal to a shared ‘I-you’ thought, 
expressed by A using ‘I’ and B using ‘you’, see also Longworth 2013. Crucially, on his 
account, such sharing demands different things of each participant, different ways of grasp- 
ing, and hence thinking, the same I-you thought, depending on one’s relation to the referent. 
In particular, what is required of B in grasping the I-you thought she express in saying ‘You 
are about to miss the train’ requires that she stand in, and be sensitive to, a relation to A that 
makes appropriate the use of the second person, as the you-indexicality claim maintains. 
Heal’s main aim in ‘Second Person Thought’ is to make plausible and compelling the 
very idea that social interactions can impose constraints on each participant’s thinking by pro- 
posing an imaginative reconstruction of kinds of thinking that are more primitive than those 
that presuppose self-consciousness and language use but which can be strengthened in such a 
way as to be said plausibly to underpin learning to use the second person pronoun. To this 
end, she suggests we look at forms of cooperative activity which involve a kind of reasoning 
the validity of which can best be understood as requiring something like a ‘we-minus-I’ way 
of thinking. This is in a sense one-step more sophisticated than pure plural reasoning, but one 
step less than full blown you-thinking. We have the underpinnings for latter when we have a 
form of cooperative activity, which she labels ‘face-to-face’. With this in play, she argues, a 
child would meet the conditions required for picking up the meaning of ‘you’. 
Finally, as Matthias Haase notes in ‘Am I You?’, it is part and parcel of Heck’s rejection 
of the you-indexicality claim that it is conceivable that there could be ‘speakers of a 
language who never directed their utterances to their fellows’. It is, on his picture, inessen- 
tial to thought that the speech that expresses it is in fact addressed to others rather than the 
cosmos. This appears to rule out in advance the very idea of ‘essentially communicative 
thinkings’. Haase contrasts Heck-like views with a view he himself argues for, and ascribes 
to Reid, according to which there do exist essentially ‘social operations of mind’. Unlike 
their ‘solitary’ correlates, these require, ‘as acts of mind, “intercourse with some other intel- 
ligent being who bears a part in them”’. For Reid, as interpreted by Haase, these acts of 
mind depend for their very existence on the other’s uptake: such acts ‘cannot exist [ . .  . ] 
without being known to the other’ (Reid [1788] 2010,  330). 
 
3.2. The signiﬁcance of the you-indexicality claim 
In summarizing claims relevant to developing the you-indexicality claim, I have not merely 
glossed over other topics central to each of the four papers, but also over potential disagree- 
ments among them, which are arguably as important and interesting as is their agreement on 
the key intuition underpinning the you-indexicality claim. Such issues include the fundamen- 
tally important question raised by Heal’s paper of how much illumination, and of what kind 
we can gain from considering more primitive ways of thinking – important in its own right 
and crucial for assessing the philosophical signiﬁcance of work in developmental psychol- 
ogy, for example. There is also the thought-theoretical question of whether and how the 
basic Fregean framework can handle the very idea of you-thinking, raised in particular by 
comparing  Longworth’s  and  Ro¨ dl’s  contributions  (see  also  Thompson  2004). Finally, 
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there is the question of the extent to which doing justice to you-indexicality requires endor- 
sing some of the idealist claims implicit, arguably, in Ro¨ dl’s account. 
That said, I will make do here with underscoring what I take to be one key idea that 
unites them, the claim that there is a kind of thinking about another that can only occur 
when one is in fact standing to that person in a relation that warrants and makes appropriate 
the use of ‘you’. One way of bringing out the import of this emphasis on relationality is to 
see it as analogous to the central claim made by so-called ‘relational’ theories of perceptual 
consciousness. In the latter case, the claim is that the way to take on board what might be 
called the ‘essential relationality’ of perception is to recognize that we need to refer to prop- 
erties of perceived objects in describing how things are for the subject, from within her con- 
scious perspective, when she has a perceptual experience. Subtract the perceived object and 
there is no perceptual phenomenology there to describe, though there may be similar and 
related phenomenologies. Analogously, one, minimally strong way of formulating the rela- 
tional import of the you-indexicality claim is this. There is a kind of thinking about another, 
you-thinking, which is essentially relational in the following sense. In order to get right how 
things are from A’s self-conscious perspective when she thinks of B in this way, we need to 
refer to B and to B’s self-conscious thinking. Subtract B and her thoughts and there is, at 
best, a simulacrum of the kind of thinking A is employing in the relational  case. 
This is a very rough, minimally strong formulation of what the papers here may be seen 
as claiming, which needs reﬁning and ﬁne-tuning to take account of differences among 
them. So far, I have not attempted to engage with the details of the arguments put  
forward in the various papers, and this is how I will keep it, except to note a distinction 
between two different styles of argument. On one, the minimalist approach, the argument 
says not much more than: the you-indexicality claim is an intuitively attractive way of 
describing what is going on in such cases and it is up to you, the objector, to say what is 
wrong with it. I think all the papers here can be seen as presenting this kind of case. A 
more ambitious approach to take is: unless you adopt some variant of the you-indexicality 
claim there are various agreed desiderata you will not be able to explain. I leave it up to the 
reader to determine which of the papers should be read as making this stronger challenge 
and whether, if they do, they succeed. 
Suppose at least some of these arguments for you-indexicality work. Suppose, that is, 
that the existence claim for you-thinking can be made good. What is its signiﬁcance? Why 
does it matter and to what? Well, it clearly has implications for, and connections with, a 
wide range of issues in theory of thought. But our particular concern here is with the   
kind of issues that make people think that the ‘second person’ heading captures something 
important about the way we understand others, reason morally about them and depend on 
them for knowledge. The particular signiﬁcance question of interest here, then, is this. Does 
and should the you-indexicality claim have a role to play in explaining why appeal to the 
second person is important in these other areas? I return to this question in the last section. 
Before that, I set you a way of talking about the nature and importance of the second person 
in ethics and testimony which makes no appeal at all to  you-thinking. 
 
 
4. Moral obligation, testimony and the second person 
4.1. Introduction 
In Section 2, I introduced a thin notion of a ‘second person relation’. On this notion, it is the 
relation in which two people stand to each other, in virtue of which use of the second person 
pronoun is possible and appropriate. One topic-neutral way of thickening this relation that I 
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proposed was to appeal to the metaphor of bipolarity. The way I did so stripped it of the 
moral, normative content that informs Thompson’s own use of the metaphor. It is now 
time to re-introduce it. A question that will concern us over the next two sections is this. 
Does the notion of the ‘second person’ have a role to play in explaining and/or justifying 
the claim that at least some moral obligations and rights have an essentially bipolar struc- 
ture? One way to proceed, as noted earlier, is to ask about a possible role for you-thinking. 
In this section, though, I focus on a completely independent, much discussed way of 
attempting to link the second person with bipolarity. 
Thompson’s question, very crudely, is this. Can we explain what makes it wrong for me 
to break my promise to you, for example, by appeal to an arc of normative relations that 
hold between us, one that generates obligations I must respect if I am just? The alternative 
is to say that ultimately what makes it wrong to for me break my promise to you, or harm 
you in any other way, must always be explained by appeal to non-relationally speciﬁed 
norms, which supply me with monadic reasons for acting. Darwall calls the latter ‘state- 
of-the-word’ reasons, reasons that specify the way the world ‘ought to be for its own 
sake’ as Moore put it. Such reasons, on his account, are ‘agent-neutral’. A chief claim 
Darwall makes in ‘Bipolar Obligation’ (2012) is that we need to appeal to his own, inde- 
pendently motivated account of what makes a reason for action second personal in order 
to explain and justify the existence of purely relational or bipolar obligations. In the next 
section, I set out the bare bones of his account of second person reasons in ethics, together 
with a closely related appeal to the second person in testimony. I then return to the question 
of whether this way of linking bipolarity and the second person can  work. 
 
4.2. The second person reason  claim 
Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability is the source 
of much recent debate about the second person in ethics. His central claim is that morality 
rests on no more than a ‘common competence .. . to enter into second-personal relations of 
reciprocal address’ (2006, 59). As he develops it, it becomes clear that he is not interested 
in just any kind of address that warrants the use of ‘you’, but, rather, in subclass of these, 
one expressive of ‘second person attitudes’. Again, the latter are not merely whatever attitudes 
one has when one is in a position to use the second person pronoun. The second person atti- 
tudes he is interested in are expressions of what he labels a ‘second person standpoint’, which 
is ‘the perspective you and I take up when we make and acknowledge claims on one another’s 
conduct and will’ (2006, 3). When, as in Hume’s much-cited example, I ask you to remove 
your foot from my gouty toe, according to Darwall, I make a claim on your conduct which I 
present as authoritative, and which in being acknowledged as such by you, gives you a second 
personal reason to act. As he summarizes it, a second personal reason ‘is one whose validity 
depends on presupposed authority and accountability relations’ (2006, 8). 
As Peter Faulkner notes in ‘The Moral Obligations of Trust’, the structure of this way 
of ﬁlling in the notion of what it is for reason to be second personal is also found in the 
literature on testimony and trust. In Richard Moran’s version, discussed by Will Small in 
‘Teaching and Telling’, ‘the special relations of telling someone, being told, and accepting 
or refusing another’s word . . . provide a kind of reason for belief that is categorically 
different from that provided by evidence’ (2005, 4). In Benjamin McMyler’s version, dis- 
cussed by Faulkner, when A tells B that p, A demands that B believe him, and presents 
this demand and so his telling, as justiﬁed. B in turn, in responding to this demand, is 
recognizing A’s epistemic authority, and acquires thereby a distinctively second personal 
reason for belief (McMyler 2011). 
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4.3. Responses to the second person reason   claim 
In both the testimonial and moral case, such appeals to authority and recognition of it are 
intended to show a sense in which moral reasons and testimony-based reasons are ‘irredu- 
cibly’ second personal. Darwall’s own response to second person reason claims in testi- 
mony, quoted by Faulkner, is this. 
 
Someone can give you a reason to believe something not just by pointing to evidence, but also 
by simply telling you it is so. When you believe something for this reason, you give the person 
whose testimony you trust a kind of second-personal authority in your own reasoning about 
what to believe. But this authority is not second-personal all the way down. It ultimately 
depends upon and is defeasible by epistemic authority. (2006, 57) 
 
Ultimately, the epistemic status of the belief you acquire through testimony, according to 
Darwall, turns on the speaker’s relation to the evidence for what she tells you. This 
general kind of criticism of ‘assurance theories’ is endorsed and independently argued for 
by Faulkner, but is then applied by him to Darwall himself. The main intuition driving his 
response to Darwall is similar in spirit to Wallace (2007). To return to the gouty toe case, 
surely, the intuition is, relieving your pain is something I ought to do whether or not you 
demand it, indeed whether anyone is so much as inclined to demand it. Actual demands 
seem neither here nor there, morally speaking. 
It is in order to forestall this line of objection that Darwall writes  that 
 
it takes neither an explicit actual demand nor a demand that is implicit in actual human beings being 
prone to make it, either individually or collectively, in order for a claim or demand to be in force. 
The demand is made by the ‘moral community’ and by all of us insofar as we are members. 
 
The ideal moral community should be likened, says Darwall, to ‘ Kant’s idea of a ‘realm of 
ends’, a regulative ideal that we employ to make sense of our ethical thought and practice 
(Darwall 2007, 64 – 65). 
This passage is referred to by the three contributors who discuss Darwall – Faulkner, Haase 
and Lavin, though to different effect. For all three, the move to the ideal moral community and 
demands it would make is tantamount to depriving Darwall’s second person reason claim of 
any substance and force. Faulkner, exclusively concerned as he is with Darwall’s version  
of the second person claim, uses it to bury it. He concludes that, in the end, the moral force 
of any demand I might address to you depends on the existence of a state-of-the-world  
reason to back it up – it is in this sense not ‘second personal all the way down’. Haase and 
Lavin, on the other hand, use it both to query Darwall’s particular version of the claim that 
there is an ineliminable second person core to ethics and to raise the possibility of different 
ways of linking the second person to ethics, speciﬁcally to the bipolarity issue. 
A brief word on Faulkner on trust will serve as an introduction to this different 
approach. According to Faulkner, the trust underpinning episodes of A trusting B to do 
such and such, do not, contra McMyler, provide A with second person reasons for belief 
that B will do it, of the kind outlined above. Rather, trust is grounded in facts such as    
A’s dependence on B, where, according to Faulkner, this fact of dependence or reliance pro- 
vides B with a state-of-the-world reason to do what she is being trusted to do. Interestingly, 
though, the relevant state-of-the-world reasons he cites consist of relations between two 
people, such as dependence, love and so forth. Unlike Darwall’s, that is, they are not 
‘agent-neutral’. This might suggest a quite different route into linking the second person 
to Thompson’s contrast between relational and monadic obligations and rights. Rather 
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than giving Darwallian appeals to commitments incurred by various forms of address a 
foundational role in establishing bipolarity in ethics, the alternative appeals to the second 
person to describe ways of others being present to our minds, through various relations 
that might hold between us, where it this that is said to ground the possibility of bipolar 
normative arcs. This is the line pursued  by Lavin and Haase,  and I return  to it in the  
next section. Before that a ﬁnal word about knowledge transmission and the second person. 
 
 
4.4. Teaching and telling 
Telling is bipolar in the minimal sense that it succeeds by its own lights only when it results 
in the appropriate uptake by the person being told. Even if you think that reasons for belief 
in the testimonial case are not second personal ‘all the way down’, there is independent 
interest in the details of how this bipolar structure should be  explained. 
In this spirit, Small claims that if our interest in testimony and the second person is due, 
as Moran has it, to recognition of the enormity of our epistemic dependence on others, we 
should be looking at least as hard at how teaching works. Doing so serves to open up ques- 
tions about how and whether authority plays a fundamental role in the transmission of 
knowledge between subjects. And when we do so, the issues turn out to be more compli- 
cated than relentless focus on the second person reason claim might  suggest. 
On the one hand, the relation of teacher and learner exhibit bipolarity in our thin, topic- 
neutral sense. In a manner similar to telling, teaching only succeeds, by its own lights, when 
there is uptake, in this case, when learning occurs. On the other hand, when we look to thicken 
it, Small argues, we cannot simply extend to teaching the explanation second person theorists 
apply to telling. For one thing, any authority I might claim as teacher is not my own. When I 
teach I am not saying, in Moran’s terms, ‘take it from me’, but am, rather, ‘speaking on behalf 
of the subject matter’. For another, teaching does not ‘aim at being believed’ (the latter is 
Moran’s characterization of the aim of telling). Learning, says Small, is not a matter of believ- 
ing a heap of propositions, but, rather, a matter of learning to ‘do it for oneself’, whether it is 
maths or piano playing. And is what we aim to achieve in teaching. This is not to say authority 
disappears, but the way it enters the scene is far more complicated, Small argues; and one aim 
of his paper is to become clearer about how exactly it works in the teaching case. 
Small’s subtle investigation of teaching contains the materials for exploring links with 
other topics that come up under the ‘second person’ heading. One worth highlighting is this. 
A central claim he develops is that in teaching we aim to initiate the student into our practice 
in such a way as to make her an independent contributor to the spread of knowledge. This 
emphasis resonates with a strain running through all discussions of the importance of the 
second person, in ethics, philosophy of mind and in at least some discussions of testimony, 
namely that in participating in bipolar transactions each pole in the transaction needs to treat 
the other as an autonomous subject. I turn now to attempts to establish links between bipo- 
larity and the second person speciﬁcally targeted at highlighting the role the latter plays in 
making other subjects present to us as autonomous centres of  consciousness. 
 
 
5. Connections 
5.1. The you-indexicality claim and bipolarity in   ethics 
Darwall’s retreat to demands that ideal moral communities would make appears to deprive 
his second person claim of substance. But to return it to centre stage, as he sets things up, 
would appear to require making moral obligations contingent on actual demands made by 
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others. One way of responding to the contingency problem, suggested by Christine 
Korsgaard and also endorsed by Darwall himself, is to say that self-address is internal to 
the very act of rationally taking on a moral obligation. ‘I think that every rational agent 
stands in what Darwall would call a second-personal relation to herself – she has a  
second personal voice within’ (Korsgaard 2007, 11). Contingency is thus avoided, and  
the second person is made, as she puts it, ‘unavoidable . .  . because I do not have to dis- 
cover, by making and responding to demands on others, that I am answerable to myself. 
That fact is made clear to me by the voice of the second person within’ (Korsgaard    
2007, 23). 
Haase’s paper is an extended investigation of whether this kind of internalization of 
second person address can be used to ground normative arcs and obligations between 
oneself and real others, as Korsgaard intends it to do. In effect, he presents this kind of 
view with a dilemma: either we treat such internal uses as derivative on uses in actual 
encounters with actual others, in which case we are still owed an explanation of how  
there can be normative relational arcs between two people which are not contingent on 
demands they happen to make. Or we treat self-address as a genuine case of interacting 
with another, as Korsgaard seems to suggest we should, in which case we need to    
invoke implausible and unworkable theories about self-division. 
The idea that we need to appeal to the ‘you within’ in order to make the second person 
internal to self-conscious moral reasoning stems, Haase argues, from a picture of thinking 
which, like Heck’s, refuses to recognize essentially social ‘acts of mind’, in Reid’s terms, or, 
in our terms, the ideas underpinning the you-indexicality claim. In contrast, once we allow 
such acts, he argues, the presence of real, genuine others, can both be internal to the self- 
conscious thinking, thinking I employ when reasoning about what I ought to do, and, at the 
same time, depend on actual encounters with others. Or, rather, this is the promise implicit 
in the you-indexicality claim. 
Haase’s response, I suggest, serves to separate out two distinct ingredients in Kors- 
gaard’s appeal to the notion of ‘self-address’. The ﬁrst retains Darwall’s emphasis on the 
notion of address, and uses the ‘second person’ label to describe commitments incurred  
by particular kinds of address. The other in effect shifts the point of appeal to the second 
person, away from using the label to refer to forms of address, to using it to label a way 
of thinking that make the presence of others internal to my practical reasoning. Haase   
can be read as proposing that we adopt the latter shift, and then saying that the you-indexi- 
cality claim makes the ﬁrst component in Korsgaard’s response to Darwall at best 
redundant. 
The idea that if the second person is important for ethics, we need to link it to questions 
about how others can be present to our consciousness is the key message Lavin aims to 
drive home in his paper. I end with his formulation of these issues, some challenges he 
raises, and one potential way of beginning to address them, implicit in Johannes Roessler’s 
‘Reason Explanation and the Second-Person Perspective’. 
 
5.2. Other wills 
The traditional formulation of the conceptual problem of other minds asks: how do we make 
sense of the very idea of there being other subjects out there, other centres of consciousness, 
other points of view on the world? A potential attraction of the you-indexicality claim in 
this context turns on the main idea informing it, namely that indexical I-as-subject thinking 
about oneself can be internally linked to indexical ways of thinking of another, in a way that 
requires the reality of the other thus thought about. This, in turn, is one way of giving initial 
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expression to a major idea informing the ‘you turn’, mentioned at the outset, that appeal to 
the second person shows how we in fact bridge what is often supposed to be an unbridge- 
able gap between our ﬁrst person awareness of ourselves as subjects and our awareness of 
others as such. 
Attractive as it may be, this is still very schematic. For it to begin to look like a genuine 
move we need a more detailed account of how, when I am engaged in you-thinking about A, 
A’s perspective is both present to me as a genuinely ‘ﬁrst person perspective’ and, at the 
same time, present to me as distinct from mine. One suggestion made by Lavin is that 
there is a deep interdependence between how we frame and respond to this question and 
how we respond to what Schopenhauer calls ‘the great mystery of ethics’. This the question 
of how it can make so much as make sense ‘for the well-being and woe of another to move 
my will immediately, i.e. in just the way that only my own otherwise does?’ (Schopenhauer 
[1841] 2009, 200). 
As Lavin interprets it, Schopenhauer’s question is the following. How can my practical 
reasoning, concerned as it is with my own actions, incorporate deliberations about others in 
a way that both internalizes the other’s practical point of view and preserves its distinctness? 
Lavin, who agrees with those who argue that neither appeal to ideal communities nor to 
internalized second persons serves to give the second person a foundational role in  
ethical reasoning, suggests that if the second person has an important role in explaining 
morality, this is where its importance will lie. This suggests an immediate link with the con- 
ceptual problem of other minds. However, the latter is often approached, says Lavin, as if 
both the question and answers to it are of mere theoretical interest. He argues, in contrast, 
that if the second person is important in addressing the other minds problem this will be in 
part, at least, because it makes possible an understanding of the reality of other agents, other 
wills, in a way that simultaneously addresses Schopenhauer’s question. 
The challenge he sets those who think the second person is important in explaining our 
relation to others, in both ethics and the philosophy of mind, is to make good such connec- 
tions. Although independently motivated, Roessler’s paper, with which I end, suggests one 
way of beginning to engage with Lavin’s challenges. 
 
5.3. Others’ actions 
It is largely accepted in the current literature on action that when we ask why someone did 
something, there are two quite different kinds of understanding we may be after. We may be 
interested in making the action rationally intelligible, from the subject’s perspective, in 
which case we are interested in the subject’s ‘motivating reasons’. Alternatively, we may 
be interested in whether the subject really had a good reason to act. Interest in the latter 
question introduces a quite distinct enterprise, of asking for ‘normative reasons’. As 
Wallace elaborates the distinction, these two ways of asking for reasons ‘are characteristi- 
cally posed from very different points of view’. The perspective ‘within which normative 
reasons have their place is characteristically prospective, ﬁrst-personal and deliberative’ 
(Wallace 2006, 66). In contrast, ‘when we address the question of motivation, we typically 
focus on an action that has already been performed, and we think about the action from a 
distinctively third-person perspective’. 
One suggestion Roessler makes is that this ‘two-concept’ view, as he calls it, distorts a 
fundamental aspect of the way we often make sense of others’ actions; and that the way to 
correct for this is to take seriously the second person setting in which Anscombe presents 
her account of practical reason. In what Roessler, following Thompson, calls Anscombe’s 
‘fundamental scene’, my attention is caught by your doing A, I ask ‘Why are you doing A?’ 
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and you proceed to tell me about your reason for doing A (Thompson 2011, 206). As Roess- 
ler notes, on Anscombe’s account, this ﬁrst question is often not the end of the matter; argu- 
ments and discussions follow, as I attempt to make sense of what you are doing. (‘Roughly 
speaking, it establishes something as a reason if one argues against it.’ (1957, 24). Were the 
enterprise of making your action intelligible always a matter of suspending my own delib- 
erative perspective, arguing would not make sense as a way of furthering my understanding 
of what you are doing – I would, as Roessler notes, be switching to a different enterprise, 
and Anscombe would be guilty of a category mistake in treating such second personal 
exchanges as the core case for explaining how we make actions intelligible by asking for 
reasons. Roessler argues, in contrast, that we should take the second person context in 
which action explanation often occurs as a reason for thinking the two-concept view mis- 
represents the manifest image of intentional action. 
Taking seriously the second person context, on Roessler’s account, requires thinking of 
action explanation as often involving a sharing of a deliberative perspective, coupled with a 
capacity to recognize that others’ perspectives on the right way to do things might differ – 
that is what arguing consists in. What, in particular, introduces the distinction between one’s 
own perspective and that of the other is that one is engaging in such arguments, not in order 
to decide what to do, but in order to understand what others are up to. This way of present- 
ing the importance of taking the second person seriously arguably bears directly on ques- 
tions Lavin raises. For we have here, potentially, one way of beginning to address the other 
minds problem which does engage with the question of how awareness of others can be 
connected directly to what I do. If such sharing of normative perspectives is implicated   
in my understanding of others’ actions, one kind of gap between others’ wills and one’s 
own actions may not be as wide as is sometimes  supposed. 
 
 
6. Concluding comment 
It is worth stressing, again, that the issues I have touched on represent a small subsection of 
issues raised by individual papers. It is also worth noting, again, how many second person 
claims recently aired, in many areas of research, have not even been mentioned.
3 
The latter 
said, though, the papers collected here, in addition to their intrinsic merits, do, I believe, 
provide a valuable basis for approaching these other claims – by jointly suggesting an 
initial mapping of the terrain they do cover, and giving shape and direction to some of   
the most fruitful questions to pursue in taking the you turn  further. 
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Notes 
1. For a good introduction to recent interdisciplinary work in neuroscience, developmental psychol- 
ogy and philosophy, see Schilbach et al.’s (2013) Brain and Behavioural Science target paper, 
and responses to it. 
2. For an excellent discussion of Peacocke’s paper see Martin (2014). 
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3. The latter include claims in developmental psychology, neuroscience and traditions of philoso- 
phical thought about the second person not represented here. Many of these are concerned   
with important topics I have not raised, ones that requires much separate discussion, namely  
the role of imagination, empathy and other emotions in connecting minds to each other. For 
more on these topics see, e.g. Schilbach et al. (2013), and philosophical papers in Thompson 
(2001). 
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